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A SCHEMA-THEORETIC VIEW OF READING
OAt one level, reading can be described as the process of
translating graphemic strings into spoken words. However, what we
really mean by reading is not the ability to decode words but the
ability to extract the meaning, both explicit and implicit, from
the written text. r It depends on the intricate coordination of our
visual, linguistic, and conceptual information-processing systems.
If we are to understand reading, we must find a way to break it
down into a set of more tractable subskills and to identify their
interrelations.
The standara approach is to begin with the ultimate goal of
the reauer and then to determine its prerequisites. At the
hignest level, the reader has successfully read a passage if he
understands it both as it was intended by the author and in terms
of its impact on himself. Tnis presumes that the reader has
extracted the information provided by the text, which in turn,
depends upon his having comprehended the individual sentences,
which depends upon his having correctly processed the clauses and
phrases of those sentences, which depends upon his having
recognized the component words of those units, which depends upon
his having recognized their component letters.
When reading is analyzed in this way, the component levels of
processing appear to be organized hierarchically. The attainment
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of any given level presumes the execution of all subordinate or
less complex levels; moreover, the converse is not strictly true.
whereas the reading of a written passage depends on the reading of
its sentences, words, and letters, the dependency is, in some
sense, unidirectional. An individual letter may be perfectly
legible whether or not it is embedded in a word, a sentence, or a
passage. Similarly, we are fully capable of reading individual
words and sentences in the absence of a larger context. This
asymmetry has been exploited by traditional analyses of reading.
For teachers, it provides a rational structure for instructional
programs: start at the bottom, with single letter recognition, and
successively work up through the higher level skills. For
researchers, it provides a means of empirically isolating the
processes involved at any given level in the structure: the
effects of higner order processes on the level in question are
supposed to be null, and the effects of lower processes can be
empirically identified and subtracted out.
The problem with this approach is that when we are reading a
meaningful passage, we are not reading its component letters,
words, and sentences in the same way as when they are presented in
isolation. Rather, processing at each level is influenced by
higher, as well as lower order information. Thus, individual
letters become more perceptible when they are embedded in words
(Reicher, 1969, Wheeler, 1970). Individual words are recognized
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more easily when they are embedded in meaningful sentences
(Tulving & Gold, 1963, Schuberth & Eimas, 1977). Unfamiliar words
may oe processed more easily if they are embedded in a familiar
story (Wittrock, Marks, & Doctorow, 1975). Sentences that more
coherently integrate the underlying semantic relations may be
assmilated more easily than those that do not, irrespective of
their syntactic complexity (Pearson, 1974; Haviland & Smith,
1974).
These sorts of interactions tremendously ease the task of the
skilled reader. Because of them, he is not obliged to grind
through every graphemic detail of the written representation.
Instead he may opt to process lower order information only as is
necessary for checking his higher order hypotheses about the
content of the passage. By contrast, these sorts of interactions
greatly complicate the task of analyzing the reading process.
They challenge the wisdom of bottom-up instructional strategies,
and they all but nullify the generality of empirical findings
based on "isolated" processes. Moreover, they leave us without a
good working model of the reading process.
Recently, however, through the combined efforts of cognitive
psychologists, linguists, and specialists in artificial
intelligence, a new set of formalisms for analyzing language
comprehension has begun to emerge. These theories are, at core,
related to the old notion of a schema (Bartlett, 1932; Kant, 1781;
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vwoodworth, 1938). In the current literature, they are variously
referred to as frames (e.g., Charniak, 1975; Minsky, 1975) and
scripts (e.g., Schank & Abelson, 1975; Lehnert, 1977), as well as
schemata (e.g. Becker, 1973; Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Rumelhart &
Ortony, 1976). We would argue that schema theory for the first
time provides a structure powerful enough to support the
interactions among different levels of processing in reading.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will first provide a
general description of schema-theoretic models and the way they
work, and then examine some extensions of the models to the study
of reading. A disclaimer is in order at this point. Many
scnema-tneoretic models have been, are being, and will be
developed, and there are some fundamental differences among them.
In view of this, we have not tried to provide a faithful
description of any one model. Instead we gloss over controversies
and differences between models in the hope of providing a coherent
tutorial glimpse of the overall effort.
SCHEMA THEORY AND LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION
A fundamental assumption of schema-theoretic approaches to
language comprehension is that spoken or written text does not in
itself carry meaning. Rather, a text only provides directions for
the listener or reader as to how he should retrieve or construct
the intended meaning from his own, previously acquired knowledge.
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The words of a text evoke in the reader, associated concepts,
their past interrelationships and their potential
interrelationships. The organization of the text helps him to
select _mong these conceptual complexes. The goal of schema
theory is to specify the interface between the reader and the text
-- to specify how the reader's knowledge interacts and shapes the
information on the page and to specify how that knowledge must be
organized to support the interaction.
Structural Organization of Schema-Theoretic Models
A scnema is a description of a particular class of concepts
and is composed of a hierarchy of schemata embedded within
schemata. The representation at the top of the hierarchy is
sufficiently general to capture the essential aspects of all
members of the class. For example, if the conceptual class
represented by a schema were "going to a restaurant" (Schank &
Abelson, 1975), its top level representation would include such
information as that a restaurant is a commercial establishment
where people pay money to have someone else prepare their food and
clean up after them. At the level beneath this global
characterization, are more specific schemata (e.g., going to a
diner, going to a fast hamburger operation, and going to a swanky
restaurant). In general, as one moves down the hierarchy, the
number of embedded schemata multiplies while the scope of each
narrows, until, at the bottom most level, the schemata apply to
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unique perceptual events. Each schema at each level in the
hierarchy consists of descriptions of the important components of
its meaning and their interrelationships, where these descriptions
are themselves schemata defined at the appropriate level of
specifity. The power of this structure derives from the fact that
the top level representation of any schema simultaneously provides
an abstraction of and a conceptual frame for all of the particular
events that fall within its domain.
Because the top level description of a schema must pertain to
every member of its class, many of its components may be but
vaguely specified. For example, in the restaurant schema very few
properties of the place to be served could be extended to all
possible members of that class, be they any variety of booths,
tables or counters; accordingly, very few properties could be
explicitly attached to its superordinate description. On the
other hand, the most general schema for the place to be served in
a restaurant effectively contains all of the service arrangements
one has experienced, or, equivalently, the collective features of
those service arrangements weighted in terms of their likelihood
in different contexts. Thus, while no specific value is
anticipated, a stereotype is defined; in the absence of further
information, the concept is still meaningful.
Because the schema specifies the interrelationships between
its underlying components, once any element is specified, it can
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oe understood in the proper context. For example, if a counter is
mentioned within the restaurant schema, it can immediately be
understood as a place at which food can be served and not as an
abacus or a parrying boxer's blow. Moreover, the introduction of
a counter might be sufficient to eliminate swanky restaurants from
consideration, thereby indirectly narrowing the probable range for
other, as yet unspecified component, of the restaurant schema.
Any important element or schema within a schema may be
thought of as a slot (Minsky, 1975) that can accept any of the
range of values that are compatible with its associated schemata.
The comprehension of a specific situation or story involves the
process of instantiation whereby elements in the situation are
oound to appropriate slots in the relevant schema. This process
not only serves the purpose of filling out the details of the
schema, but also of temporarily connecting it to characteristics
of the bound schemata. Thus, if there is a nervous old man in the
story who takes the order in the restaurant, he will be bound to
the waiter role. If subsequently the waiter knocks over a glass
of water, this fact will be related back to the nervous quality of
the old man currently assigned to the waiter role. Often, a text
will not explicitly provide the element to be bound to a
particular slot even though it is an integral component of some
relevant schema. In these cases, the reader may assign default
values. The default assignment will be determined by the values
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associated with its slot. The precision of the default
description will depend on the specifity of those values. If one
knew that the restaurant in the story was swanky, the default
assignment might be that the customer sat at a table; if one also
knew it was an authentic Japanese restaurant, the default
assignment might be that the customer sat on cushions rather than
a chair; it the story were about a particular, familiar Japanese
restaurant, the default assignment might be very elaborate.
The Processing of Information
Witnin schema theory, the process of interpretation is guided
by the principle that all data must be accounted for (Sobrow &
Norman, 1975). Every input event must be mapped against some
scnema, and all aspects of that schema must be compatible with the
input information. This requirement results in two basic modes of
information processing. The first mode, bottom-up processing, is
evoked by the incoming data. The features of the data enter the
system through the best fitting, bottom-level schemata. As these
schemata converge into higher level schemata, they too are
activated. In this way, the information is propogated upwards
through the hierarchy, through increasingly comprehensive levels
of interpretation. The other mode, top-down processing, works in
the opposite direction. Top-down processing occurs as the system
searches for information to fit into partially satisfied, higher
order schemata.
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An important aspect of a schema-theoretic account of reading
comprehension, is that top-down and bottom-up processing should be
occurring at all levels of analysis simultaneously (Rumelhart,
1976). The data that are needed to instantiate or fill out the
scnemata become available through bottom-up processing; top-down
processing facilitates their assimilation if they anticipated or
are consistent with the reader's conceptual set. Bottom-up
processing insures that the reader will be sensitive to
information that is novel or that does not fit his on-going
hypotheses about the content of the text; top-down processes help
him to resolve ambiguities or to select between alternative
possible interpretations of the incoming data. Through the
interactions between top-down and bottom-up processing, the flow
of information through the system is considerably constrained.
Even so, these processes are not, in themselves, enough to ensure
apt comprehension.
The notion that the human mind is guided by a central,
limited capacity processor is, by now, taken for granted within
many psycnological theories of information-processing. The
general acceptance of this notion among psychologists has been
principally due to empirical demands. Recently, however, Bobrow
and Norman (1975) have argued that some such construct must be
incorporated into any schema-theoretic type of system, be it
person or machine, if its responses to its environment are to be
rational and coherent.
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Bobrow and Norman's argument is based on three observations.
First, in order for a system that is so diffuse and receptive to
maintain coherence, it must be imbued with purpose. In their
words (p. 146), "without purpose, the system will fail to pursue a
line of inquiry in any directed fashion." Moreover, too many
purposes can be the same as none. Their second observation is
related: individual purposes are by definition, single-minded. In
order to select among different, and possibly conflicting
purposes, the system must have some more global self-awareness or,
in Bobrow and Norman's words, "a central motivational process."
Third, some mechanism which has access to all memory schemata must
guide the interpretive process. This is necessary in order to
decide when a schema has been adequately filled out for the
current purpose, to evaluate the goodness of fit of the data to
the schemata, and to detect and appropriately connect metaphorical
or analogical references. These observations led Bobrow and
Norman to conclude that the schemata must culminate in some
central, omniscient processor -- a grand self schema, if you will.
The primary responsibility of this processor is to adaptively
allocate the limited resources for active processing among the
various activities of the system.
Taking this notion back to the schema-theoretic model, we see
that there are two basic ways in which the processing capabilities
of the system may be limited (Norman & Bobrow, 1975). First,
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there may be some difficulty in mapping input data to the memory
structure with the result that their normally automatic, bottom-up
propagation through the system is obstructed; in this case, the
system is data-limited. Second, the various, simultaneous demands
for active control may exceed the system's capacity to cope; in
this case, the system is resource-limited and the execution of
some of the ongoing activities will be compromised. Both kinds of
limitations are relevant to the reading process.
Norman and Bobrow (1975) have distinguished two types of
data-limits on processing. The definitive characteristic of each
is that no amount of effort on the interpreter's part will
eliminate the problem. The first, signal data-limits, occur when
the quality of the input confuses the mapping process, as, for
example, when one is listening for faint signal in a noisy
environment. Examples of signal data-limits in the reading domain
range from the deciphering of poor handwriting to the
comprehension of a wholly incoherent passage. For the second kind
of data-limits, memory data-limits, the quality of the input may
be impeccable, but the mapping process is obstructed for lack of
appropriate memory structures. Both of us would, for example,
suffer from a memory data limit in trying to understand a Japanese
speech; since we know no Japanese, we could not, with any amount
of effort, succeed. Wvith respect to reading, problems related to
memory data-limits are pervasive. For the beginning reader, they
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may occur at the level of single letter recognition. For more
experienced readers, tney may persist at the levels of word
recognition, syntactic analysis, and of course, in any dimension
of semantic interpretation.
As an example of resource-limited processing, Bobrow and
Norman describe the familiar situation in which one is
simultaneously driving a car and carrying on a conversation. Both
activities can be managed as long as they are proceeding as
expected. If one, however, absorbs inordinate attention, it does
so at the expense of the other. Surprising news may result in bad
ariving; a ousy intersection may provoke a pause in the driver's
speech or distract him from listening. The analogy exists in the
reading situation -- we can tolerate more or less distraction
while reading, depending on the difficulty of our material or our
reasons for reading it.
But, with respect to reading, the more critical problems
related to resource-limited processing arise when activities
subserving the same end compete for attention. If their
respective demands cannot be met, the comprehension process breaks
down. A good reader may encounter this problem when, for example,
he is trying to read a legal document or a scientific paper that
is outside of his area of expertise; he may devote a lot of energy
toward understanding the words and sentences, only to find that he
has not understood the meaning of the paragraph. For young
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readers, this kind of problem may be especially frequent since
many of the subskills and concepts presumed by a text may not yet
be well learned or integrated.
SCHEMA THEORY AND READING COMPREHENSION
A crucial idea for a schema-theoretic account of reading
comprehension is that it involves the coordinated activity of
schemata at all levels of analyses. As schemata at the lower
levels (e.g., visual features) are activated, they are bound to
and thus evoke schemata at the next, higher level (e.g., letters);
as these schemata are activated, they, in turn, trigger their own
superordinate schemata (e.g., words). In this way, through
oottom-up processing, the input data are automatically propogated
up the hierarchy toward more meaningful or comprehensive levels of
representation. At the same time, schemata at higher levels are
competing to fill their slots with elements from the levels
beneath through top-down processing. Again, the theory is that,
for the skilled reader, both top-down and bottom-up processing are
occurring simultaneously and at all levels of analysis as he
proceeds through the text (Rumelhart, 1976).
A necessary assumption here is that schemata exist at all
levels of abstraction (Aoelson, 1975; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976).
At the letter level, the schematic descriptions may be relatively
concrete and specific. For example, the schema for an uppercase K
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might consist of three subschemata: (1) a vertical line on the
left; (2) an oblique line extending upwards from near the center
of the vertical line to a point to the right of and perpendicular
with the top of the vertical line; and (3) a second oblique line
extending downwards from some where along the bottom half of the
first oblique line to a point directly beneath the top end of the
first oulique line and perpendicular to the bottom of the vertical
line.
At the other extreme, schematic descriptions may be very
abstract and general. As an example, consider Rumelhart &
Ortony's (1976) tentative verson of the problem solving schema.
In it there are three variables: a Person P, an Event E, and a
Goal G. The schema has a two step structure:
1. E causes P to want G;
2. P tries to get G until P gets G or until P gives up.
Each of the elements like cause, want, and try in this schema are
themselves schemata, just as the letters in the schemata for words
are themselves schemata. Rumelhart and Ortony's version of the
try schema has two variables which are bound in the problem
solving schema: a Person P, a Goal G. The proposed steps are:
1. P decides on an action A which could lead to G;
2. While any precondition A' for A is not satisfied, P tries to
get A';
3. P does A.
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The problem solving and trying schemata reflect what Newell and
Simon (1963), have called means-ends analysis. In means-ends
analysis, whenever a goal cannot be obtained directly, an
appropriate subgoal is set up. This subgoal may itself be
recursively dissolved into sub-subgoals, until a stepwise means
nas been found to attain the original goal. We would argue, as
have Newell and Simon (1963), that just such problem solving
pervades many human motivations and actions. It follows that a
full understanding of many stories by and about people, depends on
being able to interpret their events in terms of something like
the problem solving and trying schemata that Rumelhart and Ortony
(1976) have outlined.
The power of a schema-theoretic account of reading derives
from the assumption that lower level schemata are elements or
subschemata within higher level schemata. It is, above all, this
aspect of the theory that allows perceptual elements to coalesce
into meaning, that allows such abstract, higher order schemata, as
the problem solving schema, to be appropriately and usefully
accessed. Moreover, it is this aspect of the theory which
provides a structure for conceptualizing the interrelationships
between levels of processing .
In order to give a more detailed description of what is
theoretically happening as one reads, it is easiest to consider
different levels of processing as if those levels were separable
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(which they are not). In the next four sections of this chapter,
we will deal successively with letter and word processing,
syntactic processing, semantic processing, and processing at the
interpretive level. In each case, the basic argument in favor of
a schema-theoretic explanation of these processes is that they
cannot be explained in terms of bottom-up processing and that the
top-down influences seem to be too automatic and too well
structured to be attributable to simple guessing.
we will describe these processes in terms of how a skilled
reader might arrive at an understanding of the following fable:
Stone Soup
A poor man came to a large house during a storm to
oeg for food. He was sent away with angry words, but he
went back and asked, "May I at least dry my clothes by
the fire, uecause I am wet from the rain?" The maid
thought this would not cost anything, so she let him
come in.
Inside he told the cook that if she would give him
a pan, and let him fill it with water, he would make
some stone soup. This was a new dish to the cook, so
she agreed to let him make it. The man then got a stone
from the road and put it in the pan. The cook gave him
some salt, peas, mint, and all the scraps of meat that
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she could spare to throw in. Thus the poor man made a
delicious stone soup and the cook said, "Well done! You
have made a wonderful soup out of practically nothing."
--Aesop
Knowledge and Processing at the Letter and Word Levels
The first step towards understanding the Stone Soup story is
that of recognizing the words. The processes involved in
recognizing written words have been a topic of prolonged debate
among educators and psychologists. On one side, there are those
who argue that word recognition must be mediated by more
elementary activities, like letter identification; on the other,
there are those who argue that words are recognized wholistically.
The first position has many practical arguments in its favor.
First, for example, the pattern analyzing mechanisms that must be
posited would be far less cumbersome if the system worked on
single letters or even their elementary features, than if it
worked on whole word patterns. The importance of this argument is
stressed when one considers the innumerable variety of type styles
and scripts that are legible. Second, there must be some
connection in the system between written and spoken language, and
our alphabetic cipher provides a natural candidate for such a
link. In addition, it provides a means by which unfamiliar
written words that are familiar in their spoken expression, can be
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"decoded." However, the potential advantages of an alphabetic
language are denied if letters are not functional stimuli in
reading. Third, thorough instruction in letter-to-sound
correspondences has been shown to be an important component of
early reading curricula (Barr, 1974; Chall, 1967); by implication
these correspondences, or some aspect of the analysis they
involve, must be useful to the reading process.
In support of the other contention -- that people recognize
words wholistically -- is the fact that people act like that's
what they do. Certainly skilled readers are rarely aware of
reading in a letter-by-letter fashion. Moreover, experimental
studies have shown that whole words can be perceived at least as
quickly and accurately as single letters (Cattell, 1886; Reicher,
1969; Wheeler, 1970).
The most reasonable solution to this dilemma is that the
process of recognizing written words involves analyses at both the
letter and the word level, and that these analyses occur
simultaneously and interact with each other. Recently, Adams
(1975) ran a series of experiments comparing the visual processing
of words, pseudowords, and orthographically irregular non-words,
which yielded direct support for this explanation. She then
proposed a model which is very much in the spirit of schema
theory.
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The basic assumption underlying Adams' model is that any set
of internal units or schemata that are repeatedly activated at the
same time, become associated such that the activation of one of
them facilitates the activation of the others. The essential idea
of the model is that the extraction of visual information proceeds
in the same way for words, pseudowords, and orthographically
irregular strings, and that their differential perceptibility is
due to interactions between the schemata against which the visual
information is mapped. These interactions are illustrated in
Figures 1 and 2.
The circles in Figure 1 represent letter recognition
schemata, the arrows represent associations between them. The
full circles correspond to schemata receiving activation from both
an external stimulus and other activated schemata while the broken
circles correspond to those receiving activation from other
schemata only. The degree of interfacilitation should be
determined by both the strength of the external input and the
strength of the association, where the latter is presumably a
function of the letters' history of co-occurrence. The strengths
of these interletter associations can therefore be estimated from
transitional probabilities, as has been done in this Figure.
Insert Figure 1 about here
This structure would predict a considerable perceptual
advantage of words and pseudowords over orthographically irregular
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STIMULUS
(a) THAT
(b) YOTH
(c) IYTN
0
Figure 1. Associated letter network. (From Adams, 1975)
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nonwords, especially given that the extraction of visual
information proceeds in parallel. That is, interfacilitation
between the component letters of words and pseudowords would be
mutual and coincident with external input, With reference to the
example in Figure 1A, the T, the H, and the A would all be
simultaneously receiving external activation from the stimulus and
internal activation from each other. By contrast, the activation
of the component letters of nonword strings, as in Figure 1C,
would depend almost entirely on external input; since the
transition probabilities between the adjacent letters of irregular
nonwords are quite small, their mutual facilitation must also be
minimal.
In order to explain the perceptual advantage of real words
over pseudowords a second, lexical level of analysis must be
included in the model. This level is diagrammed in Figure 2. The
connections between the lexical schemata and the letter schemata
represent the associations between them. The weightings of these
associations are supposed to depend on lognormal word frequency.
As the individual letter schemata receive input, they relay
activation to all appropriate word schemata, and as a given word
schema becomes active, it proportionately and reciprocally
facilitates the letter schemata corresponding to its component
letters.
Insert Figure 2 about here
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STIMULUS
CHAT
/408
ae' 
"b /
(a) THAT
RnTITH
571
( b ) YOTH
TINY
(c) IYTN1
U
I
'4
Figure 2. Associated lexical network. (From Adams, 1975)
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In terms of schema theory, Adams is positing two kinds of
interactive processes that go on simultaneously in recognizing
words: the first depends on interconnections between schemata at
the letter level, where one letter triggers an expectation for
another letter; the second depends on the structure within
schemata at the word level, where competing words are looking for
letters to fill their respective slots.
what happens concurrently at the feature, letter, and word
levels as the reader scans through the Stone Soup story is
something like this. The eye collects information about different
visual features that are present. These are features that are
automatically bound to slots that they fit in the letter schemata.
Mveanwhile, partially instantiated letter schemata are trying to
find the appropriate visual features to fill their remaining
slots. In addition, they are facilitating other letter schemata
that correspond to likely neighbors and, finally, fitting
themselves to slots in the word schemata. While all of this is
happening, partially activated word schemata are trying to
identify the appropriate letters for their own unfilled slots.
A natural extension of Adams' model would be that word
schemata facilitate other word schemata that are likely to occur
in the same sentence. This extension could explain the semantic
priming effects that have been reported in the psychological
literature (e.g., Schuberth & Eimas, 1977; Meyer, Schvaneveldt &
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Ruddy, 1975; Tulving & Gold, 1965). But when a person is reading
connected discourse, syntactic and higher order semantic knowledge
must also be influencing the identification of words. As
described below, words themselves are subschemata within these
higher level schemata.
Knowledge and Processing at the Syntactic Level
Perhaps more than anything else, it was Chomsky's (1957)
"Review of Skinner's Verbal Learning," that dealt the death blow
to bottom-up theories of syntactic processing. Chomsky argued
cogently that in building a descriptive model of linguistic
behavior, the "...elimination of the independent contribution of
tne speaker and learner...can be achieved only at the cost of
eliminating all significance from the descriptive system, which
then operates at a level so gross and crude that no answers are
suggeste-d to the most elementary questions" (p. 30). In other
words, top-down processes must be incorporated into models of
syntactic processing if they are to have any explanatory power.
Recent experimental evidence not only supports the contention
that syntactic analysis is guided by top-down processes, but,
further, indicates that this happens in a way that is consistent
with schema theory. That is, the syntactic processing of a phrase
occurs not subsequent to, but in parallel with the processing of
its lexical elements (Marslen-Wilson, 1973; 1975; Wannemacher,
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1974). Moreover, the syntactic hypotheses interact with and thus
facilitate the lower level processes (Marcel, 1974; Marslen-Wilson
& Tyler, 1975).
One of the most powerful formalisms that researchers in
artificial intelligence have developed for syntactic processing is
the augmented transition network (ATN) grammar (Woods, 1970).
Recently experimental evidence has been accumulating that ATN
theory provides at least a plausible account of human syntactic
processing (Stevens and Rumelhart, 1975; Wanner and Maratsos,
1975).
The ATN formalism is best explained in terms of a small
network that can parse a subset of English. There exists an ATN
grammar for most of English (Woods, Kaplan, and Nash-Webber,
1972), but it is complicated to understand. Figure 3 shows a
sample network for analyzing English sentences (S) from Woods
(1970), and associated networks for analyzing noun phrases (NP)
and prepositional phrases (PP). The arcs (or pointers) in the ATN
formalism act like slots in the schema formalism. Thus, going out
from the S state in Figure 3, any auxiliary will satisfy the lower
arc. "Auxiliary" defines the range of values that can satisfy
that arc (or slot). The ATN formalism, however, has no notion
equivalent to default values in the schema formalism. Like
schemata, ATN networks are embedded: going along an NP arc in any
network means jumping to the NP network to analyze a noun phrase.
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By allowing whole networks to replace arcs, the network for
analyzing noun phrases need only be specified once. This is the
same kind of power that comes from embedding in schema or semantic
network theory: one can have a schema for "trying" or a
"restaurant" which can be referred to in a wide variety of
different places by higher level schema, so it need only be
specified once, ATN networks can in fact be viewed as procedural
schemata for representing syntactic knowledge.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Woods (1970) describes how the ATN network in Figure 3
analyzes sentences as follows:
"To recognize the sentence "Did the red barn collapse?" the
network is started in state S. The first transition is the aux
transition to state q2 permitted by the auxiliary "did." From
state q2 we see that we can get to state q3 if the next "thing" in
the input string is an NP. To ascertain if this is the case, we
call the state NP. From state NP we can follow the arc labeled
dec to state q6 because of the determiner "the." From here, the
adjective "red" causes a loop which returns to state q6, and the
subsequent noun "barn" causes a transition to state q7. Since
state q7 is a final state, it is possible to "pop up" from the NP
computation and continue the computation of the top level S
beginning in state q3 which is at the end of the NP arc. From q3
the verb "collapse" permits a transition to the state q4, and
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det q 4 a p
upr^ -^"
Figure 3. A sample transition network. S is the start state,
g84 g5 ' g6' g7, g8 , and gl 0 are the final states.
(From Woods, 1970)
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since this state is final and "collapse" is the last word in the
string, the string is accepted as a sentence [pp. 591-592]."
Most ATN parsers that have been developed to date have been
top-down processors: the parser starts out looking for a sentence
in the S network, and the parser wll fail if the input is not a
well formed string according to the grammar. But there is nothing
about the ATN formalism that is inherently top-down. In fact,
Woods (1976) has recently developed an ATN parser that proceeds in
bottom-up fashion from the words first identified. This is
important in speech processing, where the small function words
that are crucial for top-down syntactic processing are the most
difficult words to identify phonetically in the speech stream. In
numan comprehension, we envision both a top-down process, as most
ATN grammars are currently designed, and a bottom-up process
proceeding outward from the first words recognized to identify
noun phrases, verb phrases, prepositional phrases, etc.
At the syntactic level then, the reader's processing of the
Stone Soup fable must be something like the following. From the
top down the reader starts looking for a sentence. There is a
high proltability that a sentence starts with a noun phrase (i.e.,
arcs must have frequencies associated with them as in Adams' model
in Figure 1), and so the reader's initial expectation may be for a
noun phrase, which "A poor man" satisfies. But different words in
the sentence trigger expectations in a bottom-up fashion: "a" is
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usually followed by an adjective or noun; "man" is likely to be
the final state in a noun phrase and therefore triggers
expectations for determiners, adjectives, and possessives to the
left and a verb phrase to the right. Thus, the nature of
syntactic constraints is different from word and letter level
constraints, but they operate in the same top-down and bottom-up
patterns. Furthermore, they operate in conjunction with
constraints at the other levels to determine what the reader
comprenends.
Knowledge and Processing at the Semantic Level
In reading the Stone Soup fable the skilled reader fills in
many details that are not in the text. For example, 1) that the
man came to the house because he was hungry and the maid sent him
away, because she didn't want to give away her master's food, 2)
that the poor man asked to dry himself by the fire because he
tnought the maid might let him in and he wanted to get into the
house so he could get some food, 3) that the maid let him in
because she felt sorry for him and did not realize his request was
a ploy to get food, 4) that the man suggested making stone soup
because he though the cook might be fooled into thinking that a
stone could be used to make soup, and, if so, she would throw in
scraps of food as she normally does in making soup, 5) that the
cook agreed because she thought the man knew about a novel dish,
and she did not realize he had invented the dish as a ploy to get
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food, 6) that the cook did not realize that the man had
contributed nothing to the soup and 7) that the reason the soup
tasted good was because of the ingredients the cook added. None
of these motivations and causal connections are in the passage
itself.
There is a large amount of the reader's world knowledge that
must be invoked in order to construct such an interpretation for
the Stone Soup fable. Table 1 shows what some of that information
might look like in schema-theoretic terms.
Insert Table 1 about here
The process of comprehending the passage at the semantic
level must be something like the following. The fact that the man
is poor, triggers the notion that he does not have much money or
wealth. The large house he comes to, therefore, must not be his
own house. Begging is one means of obtaining food (see How to
obtain goods in Table 1), and the fact that the man does not have
money satisfies the precondition for begging. Because the reader
tries to interpret actions in terms of the problem solving and
trying schemata, he will bind the poor man to the person P in both
schemata, and the begging of food to the action A in the trying
schema that could lead to some goal G. Because no goal and no
initiating event are specified in the story, the reader makes the
default assumptions that the man is hungry (event E) and his goal
G is to eat. It is the need to satisfy these slots in the problem
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TABLE 1
Some vWorld Knowledge Schemata Needed for Stone Soup Fable
A maid
1. A woman servant P1 who cleans and takes care of residence I for
master and/or mistress P2.
2. The goal of Pl is to please P2.
3. P2 pays Pl with money and/or by providing room and board.
How to please a master
1. A person Pl can please a master P2 by working hard, by being
nice to P2, and Dy protecting P2's property.
How to obtain goods
1. If a person Pl has money M, Pl can buy goods G from a store I
or person P2 possessing G.
2. If a person Pl has no money M, Pl can borrow M or Pl can steal
goods G from a store I or person P2 possessing G, or beg for G
from P2, or con P2 into giving G.
How to con somebody
1. If a person P1 has a goal GIl, and
2. If another person P2 has a means M and a goal G2 to prevent Pi
from obtaining GI, and
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TABLE 1 (continued)
3. If Pl performs an action A which P2 thinks is directed toward a
different goal G3 and which leads Pl to obtain Gl without P2
giving up either M or G2,
4. Then Pl cons P2 by doing A.
How to make soup X
1. A person P1 puts potable liquid in a pan.
2. Pl adds a large quantity of food X or a base for meat stock X
like soup bones or scraps.
3. Pl adds spices and other bits of food F that are available.
4. Pl cooks over low heat for a long time.
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solving schema that forces these assumptions. Obviously they
could be wrong; the man might be seeking food for his dog or
casing the house to rob it, but the default values are assumed
unless and until the reader is forced to revise them.
vhen the poor man is sent away with angry words, the reader
similarly makes a default assumption that a resident of the house
sends the poor man away, not because the poor man offended the
resident but in order to preserve property (i.e. food). When the
poor man comes back for permission to dry his clothes, this
coesn't fit the earlier goal of wanting to eat, so the reader
assumes that the poor man's goal has changed to getting dry from
the storm mentioned in the first sentence. The reference to the
maid in the last sentence of the first paragraph binds her to the
resident that sent the poor man away originally. To fill the
slots in the problem solving schema, the reader assumes that the
maid's goal in letting the beggar come in is to make him happy,
out of a general kindness to the poor. This is reconciled with
her earlier refusal of food, because the action taken in this case
does not violate the means by wnich she can please her master (see
Table 1).
Inside, the man apparently adopts another new goal of
teaching the cook how to make stone soup. The reader has no
schema for making stone soup; it is news to the reader as well as
the cook. But the reader, in order to understand the story, must
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have a schema like that in Table 1 as to how to make soup in
general. One of the conditions for making soup is violated,
namely that the basic ingredients be edible or meat bones or
scraps. This triggers the reader to look for another goal for the
poor man's actions. The fact that the cook put a lot of scraps
into the soup means that she has supplied the base for the soup.
This suggests that the man's original goal of getting food might
be his goal in making stone soup. There is nothing in the story
that says he eats the soup, but the cook says the soup tastes
good, which imples that it has been made. The default value when
people perform some task together is that both share the fruits ot
the labor, so that the reader should assume the poor man gets to
eat the soup. Therefore, the reader can make sense of this
episode in terms of the man's reaching his original goal of
obtaining food.
Furthermore, if the reader is clever, he will see he can
reduce the number of independent goals for the poor man to one, if
the man's request to dry himself by the fire is interpreted as a
subgoal to getting into the house, and getting into the house is,
in turn, a subgoal to getting food. This interpretation works
because an alternative to begging for goods is conning someone for
goods (see Table 1). The way the con operates here is that the
man has the goal to get food, which the maid wants to prevent. By
asking to dry himself by the fire the man takes an action which
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leads to getting food, but which the maid thought was directed to
getting dry. Thus, she misinterpreted his action and was conned.
A still more difficult inference is to see that the man
conned the cook as well as the maid. To make this inference the
reader must infer that the cook also would have refused the man
food. In the case of the maid, this is revealed by her actions.
In the case of the cook, it must be inferred from the fact that
she too would want to please her master by preserving his
property. Furthermore, the reader must infer both that the cook
believed that the man's goal was to make soup from a stone, and
that his real goal was to get her to give him some food. We saw
how the reader could realize that the man's goal was to obtain
food. The clue that the cook did not understand the man's goal is
only indirect; she marvels at his having made a wonderful soup
out of practically nothing, which implies she does not see that it
was she who contributed all of the substantial ingredients to the
soup and that he and his stone added nothing. Therefore, she too
was conned by the poor man.
Thus, the skilled reader can make sense of the actions and
motivations in such a story through a variety of inferences and
default assumptions. This involves the use of a wide variety of
world knowledge from the schema for problem solving, to the schema
for maids, to the schema for how to con somebody. Different
readers may misunderstand the story in many different ways
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depending on which of these assumptions or inferences they fail to
make or which they make incorrectly.
Knowledge and Processing at the Interpretive Level
An understanding of the interrelationships between the
character and events in a story typically requires a host of
complex inferences. But the goal of the skilled reader goes
beyond that of following the story: in addition, he seeks to
interpret or impose a structure on the passage as a whole.
Processing at this level requires even more abstract knowledge and
more complex inferences, since it depends less on the actual
content of the text than it does on the goals of the reader and
nis perception of the author's intentions.
If the reader knows about fables, the Stone Soup story will
be much easier for him to interpret. This is because fables are
constructed according to a regular formula. A fable is a short
story. Its characters, which are often animals, are stereotypes
(e.g., maids are subservient, rabbits are frivolous, foxes are
self-serving and cunning). Fables are generally based on the
theme that life requires that we be flexible: the individual who
is too nearsighted is liable to suffer the consequences--his goals
will be thwarted or he will be outsmarted; the individual who is
adaptive and resourceful will be successful even in the face of
adversity. Any particular fable is intended to convey a more
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specific lesson or moral within this theme. The moral is often
summarized by the last line of the fable. All of this knowledge
would presumably be organized in a general fable schema.
For purposes of interpreting the Stone Soup story, the
reader's first task is that of recognizing that it is a fable. If
this information is not explicitly given, it may be signalled in
bottom-up fashion from the structure of the story or from the fact
that it was authored by Aesop. Once the fable schema has been
suggested, top-down processes will be initiated in the effort to
satisfy its slots. Most importantly, the fable schema must (1)
find either a flexible successful character or a rigid, foiled
character, and (2) interpret the events leading to this
character's success or failure in terms of some general lesson of
conduct. If the moral were summarized in the last line, as is
often the case with fables, the reader would be half way there: he
would only need to relate that synopsis back to the events in the
story -- the relevant characters would be brought out in the
process. The moral is not summarized in the last line of the
Stone Soup story, but the fable schema demands that there be one.
The reader's task is therefore to use the event structure of the
story to discover what the moral could be.
If the reader has made the inferences described in the
previous section, then he should have constructed an event
structure for the Stone Soup fable something like the following:
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1. The goal of the poor man is to get some food.
2. The goal of the maid and the cook is to protect their master's
goods.
3. The man's initial attempt to reach his goal is denied by the
maid.
4. He devises a clever subterfuge to get part way to that goal.
5. he devises an even cleverer subterfuge to get the rest of the
way to that goal.
b. The cook and the maid are conned into giving the man some food
and, thus, betraying their master against their wills.
In this fable, Aesop seems to have filled two morals with one
stone. While the poor man satisfies the flexible-and-successful
description, the maid and the cook satisfy the rigid-and-foiled
description. Moreover, both the success of the poor man and the
plight of the servants can be translated into general lessons of
conduct. The generality of these lessons is evidenced by the fact
that they can be captured by other maxims: for the man, "Where
there's a will, there's a way;" for the servants, "Beware of
Greeks bearing gifts." If the reader has recognized these
lessons, he has understood the story in the fullest sense.
Since schemata at the interpretive level are not compelled by
the text, one can enjoy and feel like he understands a story
perfectly well without them. One might be fully satisfied with
the Stone Soup story without drawing out its lessons. Or one
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might be entertained by the story of Candy without interpreting it
as a spoof on Candide. But interpretive schemata add a level of
understanding that may be enlightening and is often critical. We
would argue that skilled readers have a variety of specialized
schemata, like the fable schema, at the interpretive level that
enable them to read such things as algebra problems, mysteries,
political essays, allegories, recipes, contracts, and game
instructions to their most useful ends.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the Stone Soup fable at these four different
levels illustrates how reading comprehension depends as much on
the reader's previously acquired knowledge as on the information
provided by the text. Moreover, comprehension depends on the
reader's ability to appropriately interrelate his knowledge and
the textual information both within and between levels of
analysis. The power of schema-theoretic models of reading lies in
their capacity to support these interactions through a single,
stratified knowledge structure and a few basic processing
mechanisms.
Top-down and bottom-up processing are fundamental mechanisms
which apply at all levels of analysis. Bottom-up processing
occurs when schemata that have been identified suggest other
candidate schemata at the same level or the next level up.
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Examples of bottom-up processes at the four levels of analysis
are:
1) Letters that have been identified suggest neighboring letters
and candidate words.
2) A determiner such as "a" suggests that a noun or adjective
will follow and that a noun phrase has been started.
c) Reference to "begging for food" suggests the schemata for
"obtaining goods" and "trying."
d) The man's persistent, devious, and successful measures to get
food suggest a candidate moral such as "Where there's a will,
there's a way."
Top-down processing occurs when schemata that have been
suggested try to find scnemata from the same level or the next
level down to fill out their descriptions. Examples of top-down
processes at the four levels of analysis are:
a) A candidate word such as MAN looks for M, A, and N to fill
its three slots.
b) A noun phrase looks for particular parts of speech, such as a
determiner or a proper noun, to fill its initial slot.
c) The problem solving schema looks for a goal, such as eating,
to account for the man begging for food.
a) Tne fable schema looks for a moral as the point of the story.
As top-down and bottom-up processes operate simultaneously at
all different levels of analysis, they work to pull the various
fragments of knowledge and information into a coherent whole.
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Finally, neither the basic knowledge structure nor the
processing mechanisms that have been described are supposed to be
unique to a particular story or even to the reading process in
general. Rather, within schema theory, the same knowledge
structures and processes are supposed underlie all cognitive
processes. Clearly people must have knowledge about maids, and
stories, and problem-solving, and grammar like that described
nere. Such knowledge has many uses in addition to that of
understanding text. Schema theory provides a way of integrating
our understanding of text with our understanding of the world in
general.
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